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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

6/29/43

INFORMATION ON PATRIOT FORCES

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

INFORMATION ON PATRIOT FORCES

29 June 1943

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Date Completed Page

I. Yugoslavia.................... 29 June 1943 1

II. Albania....................... 29 June 1943 23

III. Greece........................ 29 June 1943 27

IV. Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica

A. Italy..................... 29 June 1943 44

B. Sicily and Sardinia...... 29 June 1943 45

C. Corsica................... 29 June 1943 48

V. Rumania....................... 13 July 1943 51

VI. Hungary....................... 13 July 1943 53

VII. Poland........................ 13 July 1943 54

VIII. Bulgaria...................... 13 July 1943 59

Stolats, where Italian punitive expeditions have met with little success. The Mostar-Sarajevo railway has represented a prime objective in the recent battles, and is probably now in Axis hands.

Montenegro: At one time an important Partisan center, Montenegro has been partly cleared by the Italians and Mihailovich. The Partisans are now confined to the mountainous area near Boka Kotorska. Two divisions of Partisans formerly active in Montenegro have fled to Western Bosnia, and thence probably to the Sanjak. Perhaps 5,000 still remain in Montenegro.

b. Mihailovich and the Chetniks

For the first year after the Axis conquest of Yugoslavia the leader of patriotic resistance to the Axis, General Mihailovich has refrained, since his acceptance of the Post of Minister of War, from fighting the Germans and Italians. Dependent for his influence upon broadcasts from London, congratulatory messages from Allied leaders, and patronage, he has lost the services of large numbers of his former supporters, who have gone over to the Partisans. Over his remaining forces, about whose numbers and whereabouts it is impossible to be precise, he exercises a somewhat uncertain authority. He has accepted equipment and supplies from the Italians, shared

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Information on Patriot Forces

I. Yugoslavia

A. Strength and Organization of Existing Forces

1. Political orientation

The Yugoslav patriot forces are perhaps the most numerous, the most experienced, and potentially the most valuable in Europe. At the same time, they are divided among themselves by the traditional South Slav factional quarrels, which have been deliberately exacerbated by the Axis. Mihailovich has repeatedly and in strength fought the Partisans in preference to the Germans, and has virtually allied himself with the Italians, accepting supplies and equipment from them.

The underlying causes for this dissension are both military and political. Since he became Minister of War in the Cabinet of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, Mihailovich has adopted the regime's military policy of conserving his forces, and taking no major action against the Germans. His plan is reportedly to strike a decisive blow only when an Allied invasion makes a genuine success possible. The Partisans, on the other hand, believe in fighting the Axis at all possible times and places, and have put this theory into practice.

Moreover, Mihailovich's association with the exiled regime, whose more important members are most" Serbian nationalist politicians discredited within

Yugoslavia, has, rightly or wrongly, caused large numbers of Yugoslavs to link his name with the anti-Croat "Greater Serbia" political program favored by these politicians. This envisages the creation of a Greater Serbia, excluding Croats and Slovenes, and is opposed by the majority of the people in Yugoslavia. This majority is also alienated from Mihailovich by the fear that, under these politicians, post-war Yugoslavia would be an authoritarian State. The core of the Partisan movement is made up of such democrats, who favor a united Yugoslavia.

Partisan leadership, however, includes some Communists, and for some time the USSR seemed to have taken it under special protection, perhaps with the idea of using it as a counter-weight to the British-sponsored and protected Government in Exile. Natural Slavic affection for Russia, irrespective of ideology, admiration for Russian successes against the Germans, dependence upon Russia for support, and the small number of Communists in key posts have all rendered the Partisans vulnerable to the Axis label -- Bolshevik, which has been freely applied. Meanwhile Axis-inspired Croat massacres of Serbs have reawakened the old Serb hatred for the Croats. In February 1943 Mihailovich made a speech announcing that his real enemies were Croats and Communists (meaning the Partisans), and that he proposed to fight them rather than the Axis.

During the last few months, the British, impatient with the perpetual Yugoslav political feuds, and realizing that effective resistance to the Axis has been recently carried on only by the Partisans, have made overtures to the Russians, preparatory to getting in touch with the Partisans. From available evidence (including the appointment on June 26 of Milan Grol, Yugoslav Democrat, as new Foreign Minister) it seems probable that the British are pressing for a settlement of outstanding difficulties, both inside Yugoslavia and out, and that the forces of resistance may, if not actually united under single leadership, at least cease to struggle between themselves. Until this occurs, however, any calculations must be based on the known hostility to each other of forces presumably friendly to the Allies.

It must be further remembered that some at least of the forces theoretically in the service of the Axis puppet regimes in Croatis and Serbia, might easily, under stress of an Allied invasion, come over to the United Nations side. These forces, military and paramilitary, even though they do not fall under the general head of patriot forces, but rather the reverse, must therefore be considered in any account of potential Yugoslav assistance. (See below pp. 10 ff)

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2. Description of Existing Forces

a. The Partisans (The Yugoslav People's Army)

It is as difficult to estimate accurately the total numbers of the Partisan forces as it is to define a Partisan. For purposes of Allied planning, however, the rough guess of 30,000 - 35,000 men in all of Yugoslavia at present actively engaged against the Axis may be useful. Recent Rome reports place the total figure of Partisans at 23,000, broken down as follows: One Army corps of 9,000 men, made up of three divisions of 3,000 men each; each division made up of 3 brigades of 1,000 men each. In addition, 12 brigades. The three divisions of the army corps are commanded by Kosta Popovic, Peter Dopcevic, and Pera Citkovic, the first two veterans of the Loyalist International Brigade in Spain. These figures and names agree with information from other sources. It must be emphasized, however, that for the general purposes of guerrilla warfare, the normal army organization by corps, division, and brigade, is almost meaningless.

The officer corps of the Partisan Army has been mostly recruited from officers of the former Yugoslav Army. The Commander in Chief, a somewhat mysterious figure named Tito, has been identified (how reliably is not known) by the Axis press as Josip Broz, a Zagreb machinist. He impressed favorably a member of the British mission in Yugoslavia, who was with the Partisans in 1941. The Partisans have laid heavy emphasis on the political aspect of their movement, known as the People's Council, elected in Bihach at the end of 1942, and headed by a former member of the Yugoslav National Assembly, Dr. Ivan Ribar. The army officers are assisted by a political warfare staff, whose duties include the mobilization of public opinion, and the combatting of Axis propaganda. The Partisan program includes, as indicated, complete defeat of the Axis, and the restoration of a federal and democratic Yugoslavia. Partisan propagandists frequently deny Communist affiliations and revolutionary intentions, but this may merely reflect an understanding that Yugoslavia is peculiarly unsuitable for Communism.

Partisan leaders have divided all Yugoslavia into "operational zones," but in many places have been forced to limit their activities to underground resistance and sabotage. In some cases there are discussed below patriot forces who probably have no formal Partisan affiliation, but who operate in much the same manner, and are indistinguishable in practice from Partisan groups. The areas where patriots are active are as follows:

Slovenia: Here the **Liberation Front** is a Partisan organization virtually independent of the main Partisan group. Italians and Slovene collaborationists have considerably reduced its effectiveness. At present, its size may be roughly estimated at 3,000 - 5,000 men. (Although Communist influence is reported strong, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ljubljana has refrained from penalizing in any way Slovene priests who have joined the Liberation Front). No actual pitched battles have ever taken place in Slovenia, but most of the guerrilla activity has occurred in the Italian occupied areas. A new wave of resistance is reported growing, however, in the German-annexed mountainous area. Contact has been established between the Partisans in South Slovenia and those in:

Lika, Kordun, and the Croat Littoral. Activity here has been extensive, but limited to sabotage, and sudden attacks upon enemy troops from ambush or at night. The guerrillas are called *shumari,* "forest men," and number perhaps 2,000 - 3,000. Here too, Dr. Tomasic, a former Croat peasant party deputy, is in command of an independent guerrilla group not closely affiliated with the Partisans.

Croatia-Slavonia-Srem:

The Croatian "Green Kader" consists of perhaps

3,000 men under the general command of Kemfelja, former bodyguard of Dr. Machek, Croat peasant leader. They operate north of Zagreb. In Slavonia the leader is another Croat peasant deputy, Pernar, whose forces are probably small, and localized in the Virovititsa and Pakrac regions. The Croat government itself has officially stated that the patriots of Srem destroyed most of the 1942 harvest, but nothing is known of their numbers of organization, if any. The terrain of this whole area is flat and open, and does not lend itself to guerrilla operations as well as does the wooded and mountainous country to the south and east.

Dalmatia: Perhaps 1,000 Partisans harry the Italian garrisons, and their communications with the coast. Knin, Imotski, and the Dinaric Alps, scene of heavy fighting in the past, are the regions occupied.

Bosnia - Herzegovina: These provinces, now officially part of the "Independent" kingdom of Croatia, have been the center of Partisan activities. Perhaps 20,000 men were mobilized against the great Axis offensive of the past spring, which at one time forced 10,000 men across the Drina river into the Sanjak of Novipazar, where they presumably are at present. Fighting still continues along the southern slope of the Dinaric Alps in Bosnia, and in Herzegovina, within the districts of Trebinye, Bilecha, Gatsko, Nevesinye, and in the general Axis spring offensive against the Partisans, and helped the Axis in many other ways: i.e. his Chetniks guarded the Susak-Ogulin Railroad with the Italians; they helped construct the German airport at Bosanski Petrovac; locally they Rove) cooperated with the repressive militia of Nedich's Serbian Government. British liaison officers with Mihailovich are reported cut off from honest information, and he has denounced the Allies on several occasions.

At the same time, he has continued to encourage various types of passive resistance to the Axis, especially to German efforts at the mobilization of labor in Serbia. Some of his subordinates, especially in South Serbia, continue to foster sabotage. It is probable that the Germans realize the double role Mihailovich is trying to play, and a reliable British source predicts that they will somehow liquidate or neutralize his forces sooner or later.

The General is at present reported to be in the Sanjaki. In Slovenia and Dalmatia, his representatives work with local collaborationist elements. Other detachments of Chetniks operate in Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Lika. Their total number cannot now be much more than 10,000 men. Talk of several hundred thousand, circulated by propagandists for Mihailovich, is pure fantasy.

c. Collaborationist Groups

i. Slovenia -- A Slovene home guard, reportedly pro-Mihailovich, which cooperates with the Italians against the Partisans, is known to exist. It can hardly number more than 2,000 - 3,000.

ii. Croatia --

(1) Ustashi -- In the time of the Yugoslav kingdom a terrorist organization, the Ustashi is now the pillar of the Pavelich regime, (the puppet "independent state") They are responsible for the massacre of Serbs. They would be the least likely of the Axis collaborationist groups to come over to the Allied side, since they are deeply committed to fascism. It would be inadvisable to accept their help even if it were official because of the unfavorable reaction which could be expected of the rest of the population who hate them. Their numbers may total 15,000.

(2) Croat regular army -- Staffed by an officer corps recruited from the old Yugoslav army, and even from the Austro-Hungarian army of World War I, this force was at one time planned to include five divisions. A new military academy has been established.

Many purges and changes in organization, political pressure from the Germans and Italians, -- both of whom are trying to control Croatia, make an estimate of present numbers and organization difficult.

One division (perhaps 8,000 - 9,000 men) is reported at Banja Luka, where the capital has been moved from Zagreb. There may be two or possibly three other divisions, each reputed to include three cavalry and three artillery regiments. The officers of this army would probably not collaborate with the Allies; many of the men undoubtedly would. At Zagreb, Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Slovenski there are "air intelligence" stations. (presumably plane-spotter posts)

(3) SS Divisions -- The Germans have tried to organize a Croat SS Division of volunteers, under the command of General Phleps. The ranks were open to Croats from 17 to 35 years of age, and the full divisional strength was to be eked out by Germans if necessary.

The Germans also started to organize an SS Division of Croat Moslems. What success their ventures have had is not known.

iii. Serbia

(1) The Serbian State Guard (Srpska Drzavna Straza)

This organization in the service of General Nedich's puppet government was formed in 1942 from the remnants of four previous volunteer militia, gendarmerie, and storm troop organizations, each following a differnet leader. Limited by Himmler to 25,000 men, the Home Guard is probably at full strength. It is under the command of Brigadier General Johic, reported a fanatical Nazi. His army comes under the direction of Alexander Stoyanovic, now chief of Nedich's military department. Of the 25,000 men, two battalions are regularly stationed in Belgrade. Most of the officers are reliably reported to be in touch with some representative of General Mihailovich, and the non-coms and privates were recruited from members of the former Yugoslav army. One incident is reliably reported at Pozarevac, when Mihailovich captured 200 of Nedich's men, 196 of whom joined him. Therefore, this organization could probably be counted upon to come over almost intact to the Allies. The Germans realize this, and are reported to distrust the Guard so deeply that they issue no more than twenty rounds of ammunition at a time. In Eastern Serbia the Guards, in Yugoslav army uniform, are reported generally pro-Mihailovich and pro-British. The Guard has been used chiefly to hunt or destroy Partisans. In this it has been successful, so far as Serbia proper is concerned. It includes the original Chetniks of Kosta Pechanats.

(2) The Lyotich Militia -- Lyotich, the leader of the Fascist Zbor organization, maintains a private militia, which General Nedich has failed to dissolve. It probably numbers 2,000 - 3,000 men, under the command of Colonel Kosta Musinski, and includes some former Yugoslav army officers. Its headquarters, and its school for agitators are in Smederovo, and its members wear SS or regular Yugoslav army uniform with an additional cirde containing three horizontal lines. These men are anti-Mihailovich, and would not be useful to Allied forces.

(3) The White Russian Legions -- From the White Russian inhabitants of Yugoslavia the Germans have recruited legions, now reported active, in Eastern Serbia: Nothing is known of their numbers, which must, however, be small.

B. Equipment of Existing Forces

1. Present Equipment

The Partisans use chiefly old Yugoslav army equipment and captured German equipment. They are supposed to have received Russian equipment also, but stories to this effect have emanated from anti-Partisan sources, and usually include incredible details.

Mihailovich uses old Yugoslav army equipment, and equipment supplied by the Italians. Probably no German equipment.

The collaborationists use old Yugoslav army equipment, and such German and Italian equipment as they are given.

The following are the types of equipment:

a. Yugoslav Army Equipment

i. Rifles

Mauser Model '98 (1), Cal. 7.9 mm
Mannlicher - Steyr 1896-1903, Cal. 7.9 mm & 7 mm
Lebel Mod. 1886, 8 mm

ii. Machine Guns

Schwartzlose (Maxim) Mod. 1903/7, Cal. 7.9 mm
Vickers - Maxim Mod. 1901/9, Cal. 7.9 mm
    .303 British MK II
Hotchkiss (French) Mod. 1915/25, Cal. 7.9 mm
Lewis (British MK III) Cal. 303 MK II & III

iii Trench Mortars -- Pre War

Stokes MK III, 81 mm
Brandt, Mod. 1937/39, 81 mm
Brandt, Mod. 1937/39, 60 mm

iv Grenades

Mills, MK II
French VD-4

v Revolvers and Automatic Pistols -- Pre-war Yugoslav Equipment

Luger, 9 mm, Auto Pistol
Mauser, 7.63, Auto Pistol
Batard, 9 mm, Auto Pistol

Browning (FN) 9 mm Auto. Pistol
S & W, .38 Cal. Revolver
Colt, .38 Cal. Revolver
Webley & Scott, .38 Revolver

vi. Artillery

Mountain: 75 mm Skoda, Mod. 1912
75 mm Schneider, Mod. 1919/25
65 mm Schneider, Mod. 1930

Field: 75 mm Skoda, Mod. 1915
75 mm Schneider, Mod. 1901/15/24
75 mm Krupp

b. German Equipment

i. Rifles and Ammunition

Mauser Rifle Model '98 (Gewehr '98) Cal. 7.9 mm.

Mauser Carbine Model '98 (Karabiner '98 K and 98b) Cal. 7.9 mm. This is the new inft. rifle.

Mauser Carbine Model '98 (Karabiner '98 K and 98b) Cal. 7.65 mm

Small Arms Ammuntions

Cartridge. Type "SS", Cal. 7.9 mm
Boattail 215 gr.

Cartridge. Type "SS", Cal. 7.9 mm. Boattail 180 gr.

Cartridge. Type Z (AP), Cal. 7.9 mm. Boattail 246 gr.

ii. Submachine Guns

Bergmann, Cal. 9 mm - 7.6 mm - 7.7 mm

Schmeisser, MP-38, Cal 8.9 mm, 9 mm, 7.65 mm

Machine Pistol. Cal. 38 or 9 mm

Ammunition

9 mm Pistol Cartridge Luger type
7.6 mm Pistol cartridge Mauser type
8.9 mm Pistol Cartridge (Schmeisser type)

iii. Light Machine Guns

LMG Knorr - Bremse, Cal. 7.9 mm
MG - 34, Cal 7.9 mm
Maxim - Schwartzlose, Cal. 7.9 mm

MG Cal. 7.9 mm, 215 gr. boattail

iv. Trench Mortars

Trench Mortar 50 mm
Trench Mortar, 1-18 or S'-GR-W 34, 81 mm
(corresponds to the Brandt TM of 1934)

v. Hand Grenades - (~~Captured German Equipment~~)

M-24
Model PH-39

vi. Revolvers and Auto. Pistols - (~~Captured~~)

Luger, 9 mm, Auto. Pistol
Mauser, 7.63 mm, Auto. Pistol
Bayard, 9 mm, Auto Pistol

b. Italian Equipment

i. Rifles

Mannlicher - Carcano Model 1902/1926 Breda
Cal. 6.5 mm

Mannlicher - Carcano, Model 1931, Cal. 6.5 mm

Ammunition

Cal. 6.5 mm. 145 or 165 gr. Ball "D"

ii. Sub Machine Guns

Fiat Submachine Gun. Cal. 7.62 mm
Villa - Perosa Submachine Gun, Cal. 7.62 mm

Ammunition

Colt. .38 auto. or Browning .38

iii. Machine Guns

Maxim-Revelli - Model 1916 or 1932, Cal. 6.5 mm
and 7.62 mm

iv. Trench-Mortars

Modified Brandt.	Model 1936 - 81 mm
Chamaya	Model 1935 - 30 mm

While any precise estimates of the amount of equipment is impossible, the following generalizations and comments can be offered:

The Partisans are generally reported to be very well equipped with captured German materiel, especially automatic weapons. They are known to have captured at least one German plane, to have used artillery (Yugoslav) on many occasions, to have "light vehicles" and some tanks (although this is probably exaggerated), and especially skilful and well equipped machine gunners. They also used German rubber boats to cross the Drina.

Mihailovich's position as to equipment has deteriorated. In general his forces are not as well equipped as the Partisans. Ammunition is likely to be his chief need. British attempts to supply him by air have been expensive and unsuccessful, the enemy getting much of the materiel.

2. Means of Maintaining Supplies

Production if any is very crude and unsatisfactory; the only means of maintaining supplies is by capturing more equipment from the Germans or Italians. This is at best an uncertain method.

C. Type of Service for which the Forces are Suited

1. Previous Operations

Except for the pitched battles fought by the Partisa Yugoslav Patriot activity has been limited to guerrilla operations and sabotage. Proficient in cutting communications lines, guerrillas have captured German ammunition trains, and have made it necessary for the Axis to watch every railroad in the country, many of which have been put out of operation for long periods. Arsenals and mining installations have also been damaged. Many of the guerrillas are former members of the Yugoslav army, and almost all have had some formal military training

2. Political Factors

a. Unless restrained and kept apart, Serbs and Croats will produce a chaotic situation by fighting each other. Trouble is likely to arise if Serbs are used for any purpose in Croatia, or Croats in Serbia.

b. If an Allied landing should be made under the auspices of the present government in Exile, the well equipped and able Partisan forces would probably become suspicious if not hostile. Neither King Peter nor any of his present entourage is trusted by these forces, and until the Axis has been expelled, it would seem inadvisable to alienate the Partisans.

c. If General Mihailovich were placed in command of Yugoslav forces, the Partisans would not accept his orders, since he has been their enemy. Because no Yugoslav could possibly command the loyalties of all factions, their forces would probably fight better under non-Yugoslav leadership.

d. If Yugoslav forces were to be used against Bulgarian or Hungarian occupying forces, the already clouded prospects for future Balkan peach would be made even worse. Yugoslavs will fight bravely against Germans and Italians.

e. For the same reasons, it would be unwise to use Yugoslav forces outside the country.

f. If Moslems must be fought, other Moslems or Allied troops will be likely to cause less future bitterness than Serbs or Croats.

D. Rates of Increase that can be expected in Patriot Forces when Allied support becomes clearly imminent.

1. In providing supplies and equipment to the Patriot Forces

The mere provision of further supplies and equipment might not increase greatly the number of active patriot forces. Most potential Patriots not temporarily acting as collaborators are already fighting. Efficiency of existing forces would be much improved, however, and a relatively small increase could certainly be expected.

2. In undertaking direct military operations

Direct military operations would provide the only means of releasing forces at present collaborating with the Axis. In Serbia alone, the Allies might count on at least 25,000 additional men; in Croatia perhaps on 20,000. In addition, the entire population would almost certainly help in every way against the Germans and Italians. It seems likely that only an invasion would activate an appreciable number of additional troops. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of these forces would be a double gain for the Allies, since they are now working for the Axis against the Partisans.

E. Equipment needed to make the forces effective

1. Military Equipment

It would probably be easiest and most effective to increase the supplies of the kinds of materiel already at hand. German automatic weapons, and ammunition for all types of gun indicated above would seem especially useful. Heavy weapons and planes for the Yugoslavs would not seem desirable, since trained Yugoslav personnel is lacking,

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while the Allies would undoubtedly come well equipped in this respect. For operations inside Yugoslavia against the Germans and Italians it would seem best to reinforce the Yugoslavs with the light weapons which have already proved their worth, and which they are accustomed to using.

2. Medical Supplies

There are indicated shortages of all sorts of medical supplies, and no evidence that the present patriot armies have any medical facilities, except one dubious report which states that there is a hospital for 4,000 wounded at Glamoch in the Dinaric Alps. Typhus and typhoid vaccines, quinine and atabrine, blood plasma, all would be needed in quantity suitable for a potential force of 75,000 to 150,000 men who had been under fed and fighting for two years or more.

3. Problems of Delivery

a. Because delivery of equipment by plane has proved difficult and inefficient, it would seem advisable, until such time as an actual invasion takes place, to land supplies by submarine at prearranged coastal points. Contact with guerrillas could easily be established temporarily almost any where along the Yugoslav littoral. Care should naturally be taken to deliver ammunition for German guns to the Partisans, who have such guns, and for Italian guns to Mihailovich's representative. Yugoslav types of material would prove useful anywhere.

b. Undoubtedly, by the time an invasion occurs, American and British liaison will have been established with the Partisans. This is the most pressing political problem of the moment. Unfortunately it involves the whole complex of relations between Russia and the Western Allies. The Partisans are apparently the Allies' first and most reliable hope.

II. ALBANIA

A. Strength and Degree of Organization and Training of Existing Forces

1. Political Orientation. Albania, desirous of independence from Italian rule, has used the present war to rebel clandestinely. A secret nationalist organization, the Ballikom Betar, honeycombs the country. It is constructed on the cell system, with seven persons in each cell, one of whom is in contact with a representative of the next higher echelon. The top cell contains three men (Jakova, Dosti, and Fasheri) with extensive political and diplomatic experience. This directorate is in contact with Bushati, the present Prime Minister of Albania. The Ballikom Betar controls all of Albania, except the actual military zones and the cities of Valona, Tirana, and Durazzo. Its platform, other than being anti-Italian and pro-United Nations, is purposely vague in order to curb the political ebullience endemic in the country. It supports King Zog as a stop-gap decision with regard to the future.

2. Description of Existing Forces. There are no figures available concerning the size of the individual guerrilla bands in Albania, although the over-all membership is given at 3,000, divided among 35 groups. However, they are numerous, and probably several of them are large. It is often impossible, in many cases, to determine where their "legitimate" guerrilla activities leave off and plain banditry begins. They live in the mountains and are incapable of holding fixed areas. They are poorly organized and trained.

The following is a list of the areas where guerrilla groups operate; those with an asterisk (*) are affiliated with Ballikom Betar (several others may be):

Area	Leader	
* Korca	Sefet Butka and Janp Dishnica	
Skrapar	Bilal Nevica and Mestan Joniku	
* Southern Albania	Husniks Enica	
Kurveles	Bedri Spahiu and Nana Gjoni	
* Valona	Skender Muche	
Debar	Hadji Leshi	
Luma	Muharram Bayraktar (reported very sick in March)	
* Martanesh	Muslim Peza	(allied)
"	Baba Mustafa	
Tirana	Ismail Petrela	
Northern Albania	Fiqri Dine	
* Kruja	Abaz Kupi (Kuge)	
Koritsa-Moscopolis	Rahman Svaristi	(allied)
Pogradec	Ibraim Batse	
Kosovo	Kosovo Guard for protection against the Chetniks of General Mihailovic.	

B. **Equipment**

1. Amount, Character, and Quality. Most of the Albanian guerrillas are inadequately armed with light equipment. It includes the following:

Rifles:
1. Chassepot (French) Model 1873, 9 mm., single shot.
2. Gras (French) Model 1871, 12 mm., single shot.
3. Martini (British) Model 1883, either .404 caliber or .570 caliber.
4. Mauser (German) Model 1896, 7.9 mm.
5. Mannlicher (Steyz) Model 1898, 8 mm.

Artillery: Skoda Model 1915, 65 mm.

Revolvers: Colt .45 caliber, single action.

S. and W. .44 caliber.

Chamelot-Delvigue .455 caliber, Model 1892.

Mauser Pistol, 7.63 mm.

Machine Guns: Vickers Maxim, Model 1901/3, .303 caliber or 7.65 mm.

Schwartzlose, Model 1911, 7.9 mm.

The following is probably included in equipment captured by the Albanian guerrillas from the Italians:

Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, 6.5 mm., Model 1902/1926 Breda, and Model 1931.

Fiat submachine gun, 7.62 mm.

Villa-Perosa submachine gun, 7.62 mm.

Maxim-Revelli machine gun, Model 1916 or Model 1932, 6.5 mm. and 7.62 mm.

Modified Brandt trench mortar, Model 1936, 81 mm.

Chamaya trench mortar, Model 1935, 30 mm.

2. The principal source of supply is the Italian army, from which the guerrillas have captured most of the equipment they now have.

C. Type of Operations for which These Forces May be Best Suited

1. Past Operations. In the light of the extensive past operations of the Albanian guerrillas, the types of service for which they are best suited are sabotage and surprise attacks, especially directed against the Italians.

2. Political Factors. Since most of the guerrillas are Moslem, the religious problem is present. It applies particularly in the case of the Catholic Italians (about one-tenth of the population) in the far north. The Albanians also distrust the British, whom they suspect of planning to give part of southern Albania to the Greeks. The Albanians have confidence in the United States.

D. Rate of Increase in Such Forces that Could be Expected When United Nations' Support Becomes Clearly Imminent.

The people are willing and the terrain excellent, thus the possible expansion of guerrilla activity would probably be determined by the amount of assistance indicated by the strategic and logistic situation.

E. Quantities and Types of Equipment Which Would be Needed to Make the Forces Effective for the Use to Which They are Best Suited.

1. Military Equipment. The Albanian Guerrillas should be supplied with modern light arms. For sabotage purposes they should be furnished with modern explosives and incendiary material.

2. Medical Supplies. Needs unknown: presumed serious.

3. The Delivery Problem. The Italian control of the Adriatic Sea and the rugged terrain of Albania complicate the problems of delivering supplies. There is only one serviceable airport in Albania, at Tirana, and it is controlled by the Italians; other delivery presumably by submarine. Advice might be had from the American Embassy at Istanbul which is in contact with the Ballikom Betar.

III. GREECE

A. Strength and Degree of Organization and Training of Existing Forces

1. **Political Orientation.** One of the principal obstacles to the effective action of patriot forces in Greece is the number of uncoordinated underground organizations and the divergent political tendencies which they represent. The underground organizations which actually possess or could support guerrilla forces fall into five major groups:

a. The Y.B.E. (Hyperaspistai Boreiou Hellados), "Defenders of Northern Greece." This organization, with its headquarters at Salonika, has eschewed active politics until liberation is achieved, although its political tendency seems definitely republican-Venizelist. It appears to be the only really important military movement north of Olympus and should be able to render valuable service to the United Nations.

b. The Communist-dominated E.A.M. (Ethnikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon), "National Liberation Front." The E.A.M. has headquarters at Athens. With its associates and subsidiaries, of which the E.L.A.S. (Hellenikos Laikos Apeleutheriotikos Stratos - "Greek Popular Liberation Army") is the military section, the E.A.M. is the largest of the underground movements and the one which will require the most careful consideration from the Allies. Though Communists and Communist sympathizers are almost certainly a minority within the E.A.M., they dominate it because of their superior organization and discipline and have given a Communist tone to the whole. The non-Communist constituents of the E.A.M. are not known to have any comparable organization and discipline, and even should the E.A.M. disintegrate (the indications for a decline are largely rumors and do not prove a decline) its non-Communist elements in all probability would not be able to form a counter-weight to the Communists. Striking features of the E.A.M. are its immense scope and energy. Through a complex of associated and subsidiary organizations, its missionary zeal has carried the appeal to all classes and areas, and its propaganda is implemented by every available means. In these respects the E.A.M. differs from the other underground organizations, all of which are more restricted geographically, socially, and in the more limited imagination shown by their leaders. The E.L.A.S. (guerrillas) is said to be less left-wing than the other sections of E.A.M.

c. The organization of Colonel Zervas, with headquarters at Athens and guerrilla forces probably centered in the southern Pindus. This movement, which is out-and-out republican-Venizelist in political coloring, must be considered to be of prime importance from the military point of view in spite of the somewhat dubious character of its leader. There is evidence that it is in competition with the E.A.M. Zervas, however, is apparently not a man who would choose to back a losing side, and if it should ever appear that the E.A.M. was likely to dominate the scene, he might well alter his views.

d. The Kanellopoulos organization and subsidiaries, with headquarters at Athens. It is questionable how much influence this organization will have on patriot activities in Greece. It is not known to have had any real contact with republican elements, to say nothing of the E.A.M.; on the contrary it is definitely known to have collaborated with the Royalists. It appears to be largely an agency of the Government-in-Exile. It is not known to maintain any military units, although it may have played a part in recent anti-E.A.M. efforts to coordinate and centralize guerrilla activities in Greece.

e. The Royalist organizations, with headquarters at Athens. The aim of the Royalists is clearly to look out for their own future. Some of them have probably not stopped short of cooperation with the quisling government. Their chief and most successful activity has been various types of assistance to their own members. Such military units as they maintain seem to be limited exclusively to the Athens area and are designed to counter what they describe as the "Communist" menace. The Royalists represent a very small fraction of political opinion within Greece and are not known to have engaged in guerrilla warfare or sabotage. They seem to be of little value, and attempts to use them would provoke unfortunate repercussions within Greece.

Although the conflict between the above groups lacks the bitterness of the Yugoslav situation, the opposition between the E.A.M. and anti-Communist groups has on rare occasions reached the stage of active fighting.

On the other hand, in the spring of 1943 there was evidence of two efforts (possibly part of the same move) to centralize and unify the activities of the various patriot groups and to create a counterweight to the influence and aims of the E.A.M. Briefly, these efforts are the following:

i. A "Military Organization," which is intended to control military operations within Greece. This organization is to be directed by a "Center" in Cairo acting under instructions from the Allied Theater Commander. Local discretion is to be left to local commanders, coupled with financial support and equipment for the guerrillas conditioned upon adherence to the Military Organization. (This "Center" may have connections with Kanellopoulos.) Greece is divided (on paper, at least) into six operational areas, with a commander for each area: (a) Valtos, Agrapha, Dzoumerka, and Epirus (Commander, Colonel Zervas); (b) Thessaly and Kozane; (c) Salonika; (d) Giona, Parnassos, Oeta, Kallidromos; (e) Peloponnesos; (f) Euboea. The extent to which this plan has been realized is not known. The section under Colonel Zervas is the most thoroughly organized, and it would appear that Zervas, though his rank is merely equal on paper to that of the others, is well on his way to becoming the outstanding guerrilla leader in Greece. If foreign (i.e. British and/or American) support is continuous and abundant, this Military Organization may succeed in reducing all other guerrilla organizations, including the military part of E.A.M., to second place. It is reported that Zervas has been receiving funds from the British.

ii. The A.A.A. (Agonas Apeleutheroseos Anagenneseos) "The Struggle for Freedom and Revival." This organization, which may be related to or identical with the above, has issued a manifesto which is a counter-blast to the E.A.M., declaring that the fight for freedom is the sole objective at present. After the war a free plebiscite is to be held to determine the form of government to be established. The A.A.A. is willing to collaborate with Kanellopoulos but is anti-monarchist. It is supported by Papandreou, Kaphandaris, and Mylonas.

Thus it is clear that one of the most important tasks, fully as important as providing military supplies, is to achieve some correlation between the activities of the E.A.M. and the anti-Communist organization (or organizations) which appears to be developing an important bloc. Difficulties may arise both within Greece and with respect to the supporting roles of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. More precise information than is now available is necessary to approach these questions constructively.

2. Description of Existing Forces. It is estimated that not more than some 15,000 to 20,000 regularly organized guerrilla troops are operating at present in Greece. The bands vary in size, from 300 as about the largest to an average size of 30 to 40 men. Organization and discipline vary widely; some groups are well-organized and are led by Greek Army officers. In addition to these forces there are the so-called "irregular irregulars," small unorganized groups, whose activities are frequently indistinguishable from simple banditry. There has been an effort to absorb them into the larger forces; it is not possible to give a sound estimate of their numbers.

Information is available on the following patriot forces:

a. Y.B.E. (see above). This is much the largest military movement in Northern Greece, and is said to have more than 10,000 members (another source gives a membership of 5,000 with 15 companies of troops). The great majority of the members are military officers who work nominally in the service of the quisling government. It uses as cover the Athens Political Service in Salonika, known officially as the Inspectorate of Prefectures.

Organized on strictly military lines by several senior officers, Y.B.E. is solely concerned with preparation for military action. There are said to be reserve companies in

Yannitsa, Naousa, Verria, and Kastoria; and branches of the organization exist throughout Northern Greece. The YBE conducts extensive espionage within Salonika and throughout Northern Greece and has spy nets along the Serbian frontier, in Bulgarian-occupied Macedonia, and in Bulgaria. Liaison is maintained with the Ninth Division of the Greek Army at Kozane and very probably with Colonel Zervas' organization. Contact with Athens seems to be permanent. The Y.B.E. is also said to be in close touch with the Communists throughout Macedonia. Relations have been established with the British, from whom the Y.B.E. has received funds.

In general, the Y.B.E. appears to be a very effectively organized resistance group.

b. The E.L.A.S. (see above). This is the military branch of the E.A.M. Available data on the number and disposition of its forces are incomplete and often inconsistent, but a report of the spring of 1943 gives a total force of 3,800 armed troops, reported to be good fighting material. A few senior officers and about 300 junior officers belong to E.L.A.S. The troops are divided into about 15 companies. The 5th, 8th, and 9th units are reported to be operating in the mountain areas of Parnassos, Oeta, Kallidromos, and Lamia. It is also reported that a number of the guerrilla bands operating in Thessaly, usually consisting of 30-40 men, are said to be controlled by the E.L.A.S. and that they are in uniform and have a regular military appearance.

Another source states that the E.L.A.S. is divided into four sections which operate around: (a) Olympos, Pieria, and Elasson down to the sea; (b) south slopes of Kaimak-Tchalon mountains; (c) Mt. Bermius; (d) slope of

Paikon Mountain (Moglena). A large branch of E.L.A.S. is also reported in Salonika, but this may be a confusion with Y.B.E.

Many reports have come in of left-wing, E.A.M. guerrilla activity, and undoubtedly much of this activity is directed by E.L.A.S., but the connection cannot be established. An indication of the extent of the E.A.M. underground (which in some cases includes actual or potential fighting forces) is given by the following list of places where activities have been reported: Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, Thessaly, Hebros, Aitolcakarnia, Kephalonia, Patras, Tripolis, Corinth, Kalamata, Ikaria, Samos, and Mytilene.

Information on the quality of organization and discipline varies widely. Sources favorable to the E.A.M. indicate that the guerrilla forces have a military appearance; less favorable reports indicate that these guerrillas are ill-equipped and have been forced to resort to banditry to supply themselves. There is every reason to believe that supplies such as arms, shoes, clothing, medicine, and food are urgently needed.

c. Zervas' Organization. This movement centers about the person of Col. Napoleon Zervas. His force is reported to number about 5,000 troops, divided into 10 companies, operating in the mountainous area of Central Greece. (Another source gives a force of 3,000 men operating in the area of Valtos, Agrapha, Dzoumerka, and Epirus). The headquarters of Zervas' organization are reported to be in Athens.

It is said to be a force of high fighting quality, largely made up of ex-officers. Discipline and organization are reported to be good. The men are trained daily by their officers. Zervas is given credit for the conquest of

Karpenissi from the Italians. The organization possesses a good intelligence service. Zervas has liaison in Salonika, very probably with the Y.B.E. He has also been in touch with the British, although one report states that he has wasted large sums sent to him by them.

Outside Greece, Zervas is the best known of the guerrilla fighters, and he is said to have induced many of the E.A.M. bands and of the "irregular irregulars" to join his forces. If and when his tie-up with the "Center" in Cairo is functioning, he should be in a position of considerable power. British S.O.E. in Cairo will know as to this.

d. Ninth Division of the Greek Army. Since no information is available concerning this organization since October 1942, its present status is not known. It is not strictly an underground movement, but has contacts with the Y.B.E. and E.A.M. The Ninth Division has been stationed at Kozane since the German invasion; the officers and men have been reorganized to provide a fighting force to go into action in the event of an Allied landing. The division is organized along ordinary Greek military lines. Discipline is reported to be good, as are relations between regular and reserve officers. In addition to military matters, this body is engaged in anti-Rumanian and anti-Bulgarian propaganda.

e. Other groups which may support patriot forces.

Republican groups. Miscellaneous republican groups are reported, such as that under General Pangalos, but their activity appears to be political rather than military.

Kanellopoulos organization. Kanellopoulos' activities are not altogether clear. There appears to be no evidence that he is still connected with guerrilla or sabotage activities, although in his role in the Government-in-Exile he was formally in charge of subversive operations within Greece.

Royalist and Officers' Organizations. There are a number of royalist and officers' organizations, some of which have military branches. But they appear to be of little importance for either irregular operations or sabotage, and in many cases they appear to be in touch with the quisling government.

f. Patriot forces in various areas.

Information is available on forces operating in certain areas of Greece; in most cases these are probably connected with one of the above organizations. Areas which have already been mentioned in connection with these organizations are not included.

Peloponnesos. The center of guerrilla activity is in the Mani region, but small groups operate throughout Morea. The forces are probably not over 1,200-1,500 men of whom, according to one report, 600-700 are British. The political complexion in this area, unlike most of the rest of Greece, is predominantly Royalist.

Crete. Guerrilla forces are reported to be made up of Australians, New Zealanders, and Cretan mountaineers, and to be numerous and active. In addition to organized irregulars, there is a good deal of general lawlessness and brigandage in Crete.

Evros. A group of Communist irregulars have been operating in the Evros region. Their operations have been regarded as irresponsible and they are suspected of having played into the hands of the Bulgarians. Apparently the Evros gendarmerie has been in conflict with this group and has attempted to create a band of irregulars with solely national ideals who could act at a propitious moment.

Western Macedonia. There is reported to be a force of 1,500-2,000 men operating in Western Macedonia. Little or no guerilla operations though some sabotage have been reported in Attica, the Sporades, Cyclades, or the Ionian Islands, all of which are difficult terrains for irregulars.

B. Equipment

1. **Present Equipment.** In general, the guerrilla forces appear to be rather poorly equipped, though the adequacy of equipment varies widely between the different forces. Well-organized forces with outside support are relatively well equipped; other bands are so lacking in supplies that they resort to brigandage to support themselves. The over-all impression is that they are less adequately supplied with ammunition and explosives than with guns, and that all groups are in need of shoes, clothing, and food supplies.

Arms consist partly of Greek army material and partly of equipment captured from the Italians and Germans. These arms are principally rifles, automatics, machine guns, and some hand grenades.

The equipment of the Greek army was principally as follows: **rifles** -- Mannlicher-Schonauer 6.5 mm., Breda or Steyer types; **pistols** -- Colt officers' model 1925, 4½" barrel, .38 long; Browning FN model 1934, type Armee 9 mm.; Webley and Scott MK IV, .38 short; **machine guns** -- Vickers-Maxim MK II* .303 British; St. Etienne Model 1903/15, 8 mm. Lebel; Lewis (L.S.A.) MK III* and III** .303 British (Hotchkiss machine guns are mentioned in Macedonia).

Specific information on the various forces is as follows:

(1) Y.B.E. Military equipment is reported to consist of a "very considerable" number of rifles and machine guns.

The reserve companies are said to be sufficiently equipped to organize a military revolt, but this is optimism.

(2) E.L.A.S. Recent information indicates a general shortage of all types of equipment. Arms: Many rifles have been hidden, but it is difficult to obtain a concentration of these arms. The actual guns available lack ammunition. Moreover, the rifles vary in type and pattern and render ammunition supply difficult. There are very few automatic weapons such as Hotchkiss machine guns, but little ammunition for them. A few pistols of various types -- again, little ammunition. No grenades. Ammunition which has been dropped from the air in at least one instance was not dropped in the area agreed upon because of bad liaison.

Clothing: Clothes and especially shoes are scarce. Prices are exorbitant, and the irregulars lack funds.

Food: Supplied locally, but an adequate supply is lacking.

Medicine and Medical Supplies: Situation desperate.

(3) Zervas' Organization. Although Zervas has a well-organized fighting force, his troops are reported to be inadequately armed. He is said to purchase his ammunition and rifles from the villagers in the areas in which he operates. (One report, which, however, is trying to establish a case, states that Zervas' troops, along with others which are controlled from the "Center" in Cairo, are properly equipped and receive regular pay. If, as has been indicated, Zervas is receiving support from outside, his equipment may be better than indicated above.)

(4) Ninth Division of the Greek Army. According to reports of October 1942, this body had sufficient rifles and ammunition and about 35 machine guns, but lacked explosives.

2. Means of Maintaining Equipment. The guerrilla forces have virtually no productive facilities. Arms are obtained either from supplies which were hidden during the invasion, from captured Italian or German equipment, or from outside, either by boat or plane. There are frequent reports of guerrilla forces raiding the arsenals of the local gendarmeries. So far, replacement facilities have not been adequate, and much of the material dropped from the air has been captured. To obtain food and clothing, the guerrillas in some cases have had no choice but to resort to brigandage. It is among the so-called "irregular irregulars" that more or less indiscriminate robbery is most prevalent, and there are numerous reports of peasants being robbed of stocks of food.

C. Type of Operations for which These Forces May Be Best Suited

The sources very naturally refrain from connecting a given organization with a particular instance of sabotage or irregular military operations. Colonel Zervas is known to have "conquered" Karpenissi from the Italians and to be largely responsible for the guerrilla warfare in the southern Pindus. Ordinarily, however, we can merely assume that an operation reported from a given area is to be attributed to the underground organization located in that area.

The activities of the patriot forces have ranged from acts of sabotage to actual fighting with the occupying forces. Most of the actions are naturally of a raiding nature, although early this year guerrilla forces were able to drive out Italian forces and occupy certain areas in Epirus and southern Thessaly. Recent German anti-guerrilla drives, however, appear to have forced the guerrillas back into the mountains.

Acts of sabotage have been against lines of communications, installations, etc. In a few cases, such as the destruction of the Gorgopotamos bridge and the chrome mines, important objectives were damaged and the results were of considerable importance; but in many instances the work accomplished has been comparatively trivial and probably not equal to the consequent measures of reprisal.

The guerrilla forces have also undertaken to exterminate traitors; this could become a dangerous practice, considering the diversity of political opinions in Greece.

The opinion of responsible and informed persons in Greece today concerning the value of sabotage and guerrilla operations, as they have been conducted, is almost unanimous. They hold that, barring a few exceptions, these operations have not in all cases achieved results commensurate with their cost in repressive measures, punitive devastation, and loss of life. They ask that the guerrillas be restrained by some kind of unified command, if possible, and that activities be limited to operations whose success would justify the resultant reprisals. In particular they suggest that the irregular forces postpone action against the enemy until the day when, in conjunction with the Anglo-American attack, it could in fact lead to the liberation of Greece.

From the above it may be concluded that the irregular forces in Greece are best suited: (a) To undertake acts of sabotage, including works of an elaborate and extensive nature; (b) To engage in raiding actions on specific objectives; (c) To engage in open fighting under certain conditions, i.e., in out-of-the-way, mountainous areas and against numerically small forces. Auxiliary activities which they are equipped to carry on are: underground propaganda, espionage (several of the organizations are reported to have good intelligence services), and assassination of undesirable persons.

The principal problems are those of unifying and directing the activities of the various forces to their most profitable use and of timing the operations so that the drive of the patriot troops is not dissipated prematurely.

D. Rate of Increase in Such Forces that Could Be Expected When United Nations' Support Becomes Clearly Imminent

In this connection United Nations' support may be considered in two stages, (a) in supplying arms and equipment to the guerrilla forces, and (b) in undertaking direct military operations in Greece. The question of increase of forces will be quite different for each stage. In neither case, however, is it possible to arrive at numerically exact answers, both because the size of the present forces is not known precisely and because of the complex psychological problem involved.

1. Undoubtedly, if adequate supplies from the Allies were forthcoming, the number of patriot forces would increase considerably and many inactive groups could assume a more active role. For example, it has been reported that at present there are not over 3,000 guerrilla forces in Thessaly. Recent reports, whose reliability of course is not certain, state that Thessaly could maintain 10,500 men if rifles were available. It would be unwise to draw too specific a generalization from these figures, but they do indicate a real certainty that the provision of supplies would cause a large increase in the number of patriot troops.

2. If an actual invasion by the United Nations took place, there would unquestionably be a great national rising.

It has been estimated that 150,000 trained men would be available in the event of a United Nations campaign; the figure may be high but not much too high. A report from Crete indicates that morale varies directly with the success of the Allies' military campaigns and that when the time for action comes, 98 percent of the population would be for the United Nations and that a large proportion would take an active role.

The expansion of the patriot forces would be greatly assisted by a consolidation and coordination of the number of groups now working independently or even in opposition. Many more Greeks will be induced to join the patriot forces if they believe that they will work with a national organization and are not being betrayed by partisan interests.

E. Quantities and Types of Equipment Which Would Be Needed to Make the Forces Effective for the Use to Which They Are Best Suited

1. Military Equipment. A recent report from one of the important guerrilla forces in Greece indicates that following equipment is needed: arms should be light, mobile, and powerful. Small and shoulder arms, grenades, and explosives are required, as well as sub- and light-machine guns. According to this request, each detachment of from 30 to 40 men should have three light-machine guns. The rifles should all be of the same calibre. The request goes on to add that for possible major operations medium machine guns, light artillery, and mortars should be obtained. It should be noted that these last weapons would reduce the mobility of the forces and tend to divert effort to a defense of the weapons themselves.

With respect to the types of the above equipment which should be sent, the list of the most common Greek army equipment, given in Section B above, should provide a guide. In addition, it has been suggested that captured Italian arms and ammunition could be used by the Greeks since they are already in possession of Italian arms. The Greeks have requested more 6.5 mm. ammunition. Requests for explosives have been indefinite, but supplies should be sent for sabotage purposes.

2. Medical Supplies and Other Equipment. There is a great need for shoes and clothing. Shoes are of especial importance for the rough terrain in which the guerrilla forces are operating. For the purpose of maintaining the morale of the patriot forces during the time they are waiting for the expected invasion, adequate shoes and clothing are probably even more important than arms. If these are lacking there is always the danger that the forces will resort to brigandage.

Food is scarce, and has been requested by the guerrilla forces. Polyvitamin tablets, army rations, and tinned foods are desirable. Money for purchasing food and other equipment should be sent in, since the forces are in want of funds. It has been suggested that the sending of money and equipment could be used as a means to unify the various forces and force the irregular groups to join up with the more organized guerrilla forces. This technique has already been reported to have been used successfully by Colonel Zervas. Such a policy, however, would have to be used with great care, and with a realization of the political problems involved.

3. Means of Sending Equipment. The Greeks have requested that secret air and sea bases be set up to provide a means of obtaining materials. Some Greeks state, however, that it is impossible to provide their forces with supplies by means

of airplanes and parachutes. The methods have been too open; of the materials dropped by the British in Euboea, it is reported that 90 percent was picked up by the Germans.

4. General. Again it should be stressed that the problem of supply has strong political implications, which are of as great importance to the ultimate effectiveness of the guerrilla forces as the supplies themselves. If possible, the supplies should be used not only to bolster the fighting strength of these forces, but also to correlate and organize them.

IV. ITALY, SICILY, SARDINIA, AND CORSICA

A. Italy

1. Organization and Training.

a. Political Orientation. There are several labor, liberal, socialist, and communist organizations throughout Italy conducting underground meetings. They are opposed to Fascism in general and to the Germans in particular. They have no central organization and are not in agreement with respect to Italy's future.

b. So far as is known, these groups have no guerrilla contingents and have made no specific plans for armed resistance or sabotage, except perhaps in the south.

2. Equipment.

a. Amount, Character, and Quality. Many of the industrial workers in such centers as Turin, Milan, Venice, Fiume, Leghorn, and Genoa are reported to have small arms.

b. Present Source of Supply. It is possible for most chemicals and other materials necessary for sabotage to be obtained.

3. Type of Service for Which Forces are Best Suited. Propaganda against Fascism and the Germans.

4. Rate of Increase in the Event of Imminent United Nations' Support. It is unlikely that resistance groups in Italy will increase in size until invasion in a form appealing to resisters is imminent. Even then their effectiveness in any behind-the-lines operations would be very dubious.

5. Quantities and Types of Equipment Needed. Since guerrilla activity does not exist in Italy, no estimates can be made.

B. Sicily and Sardinia

1. Organization and Training.

a. Political Orientation. The people of Sicily and Sardinia, while turbulent, emotional, and often given to personal violence, are not politically-minded or especially well suited for guerrilla activities. This is less true in the cities than in the rural areas. On the other hand, Fascism has never been popular in the islands, notably in Sicily, where the Mafia has continued to exist despite Fascist opposition. Resistance groups have enjoyed a greater degree of success in Sicily and Sardinia than on the Italian mainland. There is no central coordination of these groups, and they include Communists, Socialists, labor organizations, and agricultural groups.

b. Existing Forces. Nothing is known about the size, location, or training of these groups. Members of the Mafia have traditionally been versed in the use of firearms and guerrilla methods.

2. Equipment.

a. Amount, Character, and Quality. Guerrilla equipment is most likely to include the following:

Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, 6.5 mm., Model 1902/1926
Breda, and Model 1931.
Fiat sub-machine gun, 7.62 mm.
Villa-Perosa sub-machine gun, 7.62 mm.
Maxim-Revelli machine gun, Model 1916 or Model 1932, 6.5 mm. and 7.62 mm.
Modified Brandt trench mortar, Model 1936, 81 mm.
Chamaya trench mortar, Model 1935, 30 mm.

b. Present Source of Supplies. The extent to which these groups can produce arms is probably negligible. On the other hand, it is a safe conjecture that many are armed, since large numbers of Fascist militia have recently been landed in Sardinia for the sole purpose of searching for weapons concealed by the natives. Also, there is always the opportunity to steal arms and ammunition from official supplies.

3. Type of Service for Which the Forces are Best Suited.

a. Past Operations. Nothing known.

b. Political Factors. Probably the principal value of the patriot groups, particularly in the rural sections of the two islands, would be in guerrilla activities, for which the topography and distribution of the population are well suited. They might also be able to carry on a program of sabotage against Fascist industrial and military installations. As long as the operations remain purely physical and the future government of Italy is not drawn in, political factors would not become serious. Fascism per se is abhored by all these groups.

4. Rate of Increase in the Event of Imminent United Nations' Support.

a. The Immediate Providing of Supplies. It is unlikely that the guerrilla groups in Sicily and Sardinia will greatly increase in size with no more stimulus than the possession of additional arms.

b. Direct Military Operations. The rate of increase in the size of resistance groups would probably be considerable if they knew of the certain arrival of a landing force. In Sicily, especially, almost the entire population is antagonistic to Fascism.

5. Quantities and Types of Equipment Needed.

a. Military Equipment. Exact information as to the present supply of arms is not available, therefore no estimates of needs can be made. The most suitable types of arms would be 9 mm. automatics, such as Lugers or Mausers, and 9 mm. M3 sub-machine guns. These weapons all use standard German and Italian ammunition, as well as American-made ammunition.

b. Medical Supplies. Needs unknown.

c. The Delivery Problem. Supplies could probably be delivered by submarine and aircraft only. Fishing fleets might be of service.

C. Corsica.

1. Organization and Training.

a. Political Orientation. While the people of Corsica are largely Italian in origin and speak an Italian patois, they have been under French rule for almost 200 years. They have long possessed all the privileges of French citizenship, constitute one of the 90 departments of France, and are zealously French in their political sympathies. While they have often complained of what they feel to be the way in which the national government neglected their local needs, they have nevertheless resented the attempts of Italy to woo them, and they have great disdain for the Italians.

In the politics of metropolitan France the Corsicans belonged to the moderate parties of the Left and Right. Widespread poverty and a generally rural setting have resulted in a greater degree of social and political homogeneity than in France itself. Local politics are often turbulent, but they rarely touch upon what outsiders would consider basic issues.

b. Existing Forces. In Corsica there is a well organized native force of about 10,000 men, many of whom are former members of the French military and police forces. Corsicans by nature are adept in the use of small arms. The rugged terrain, coupled with the absence of class cleavages and the diffusion of the population, makes Corsica an ideal locale for guerrilla activities.

2. Equipment.

a. Amount, Character, and Quality. Reports indicate that the Corsican patriots have a fair supply of arms available, consisting largely of revolvers and carbines. No detailed information on caliber, models, etc.

b. Present Source of Supply. Since there is little or no local production of firearms or ammunition, supplies for the maintenance of equipment have to be brought in from the outside. The Axis garrisons on the island, largely Italian, are primarily confined to the coastal port cities.

3. Type of Service for which Forces are Best Suited.

a. Past Operations. Little is known about the past operations of the Corsican patriot forces, except that their activities have caused considerable trouble for the Italians.

The Corsican patriots are well qualified for guerrilla warfare, intelligence work, sabotage, and guide service. In addition, the terrain is rough, undeveloped, and well suited to the operations of armed native groups.

b. Political Factors. The great degree of social homogeneity in Corsica would make it possible to use the patriot forces for any undertaking against the local Axis forces. The hold of Vichy upon Corsica has always been tenuous and would offer no difficulty affecting local allegiances. There should be no political obstacle confronting a United Nations' direction of the Corsican patriots.

4. Rate of Increase in the Event of Imminent United Nations' Support.

a. The Immediate Providing of Supplies. Since there now seems to be no pressing need for military supplies for the Corsican patriot forces, there is little reason to believe that additional equipment in itself would lead to an increase in the number of Corsican guerrillas.

b. Direct Military Operations. An actual attack upon the island would undoubtedly lead to a rapid growth in the size of the Corsican patriot forces. The population is at least 90 per cent pro-Allied, is especially friendly toward the United States, and resents Fascism and Italian domination.

5. Quantities and Types of Equipment Needed.

a. Military Equipment. Arms of various standard French army issue which the Corsicans probably possess will need ammunition. Other modern light arms such as the .30 caliber carbine are suited to the terrain. An extremely valuable addition to the present equipment would be the light M3 9 mm. submachine gun. Quantities needed are unknown.

b. Medical Supplies. The high incidence of Mediterranean diseases, the poor medical facilities and sanitation, the general ignorance with respect to medical problems, as well as the indubitable lack of medical supplies in Corsica, all call for medical materiel, if not medical personnel. Quantities needed are unknown.

c. The Delivery Problem. In addition to whatever French contacts with the outside the Corsican patriot forces may have, there is also a small O.S.S. intelligence mission on the island in touch with North Africa by radio. Further contact can be effected through an O.S.S. representative now stationed in North Africa. There appear to be no political problems involved in this liaison.

SECRET

Information on the patriot forces of Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark to be furnished later.

V. RUMANIA

A. Existing Forces

There are no patriot forces at present active in Rumania. There appears to be small likelihood that patriot forces may come into being in the future. The degree of likelihood can best be gauged by the following.

B. Rumania and the War

The Rumanian army has suffered heavy losses (possibly 600,000 killed or permanently disabled) in Russia. The people do not wish to continue the fight; but if they must fight, they would prefer to fight the Hungarians for Transylvania. Conviction of eventual Axis defeat is growing stronger. Fear of the Russians amounts to an obsession. Some sort of deal with the Western Allies would be welcome.

The Germans are, however, in occupation. Rumania is in theory a willing ally of Germany, and in any case feels the need of German protection against Russia until such time as Anglo-American forces might arrive. No group would seem to have anything to gain by a guerrilla campaign, and no group is likely to embark upon one unless it is planned and subsidized by the Allies. Moreover, on the assumption that the Germans will direct Rumanian resistance to any Allied invasion, it is improbable (despite the desires of certain military leaders) that any large number of Rumanian troops would be able to join the Allies.

C. Potential Forces

The members of the Rumanian Iron Guard are a dissident group within the country, which might conceivably be available for sabotage and limited guerrilla activities against the Axis occupying troops, but the military value of their putative services would appear to be far outweighed by the political and military dangers of dealing with them.

The Iron Guard is perhaps the most fanatical fascist organization in Europe, feared and hated by all Rumanians who do not actually belong. To use the Guard would cost the Allies most of their potential friends in Rumania, and would arouse in all other occupied countries emotions of fear and hopelessness. It would damage beyond repair the Allied position in political warfare. Moreover, it would be in the highest degree dangerous to entrust to the Iron Guard even such explosives and other equipment as would be necessary for sabotage operations.

VI. HUNGARY

There are no patriot forces at present active in Hungary. There is no immediate likelihood that any such force will come into being.

The present regime, however, includes elements hostile to the Axis, and inclined to be friendly to the Western Allies. War-weariness, conviction of defeat, fear of Russia, fear of Rumania, have all made the people anxious to get out of the war as quickly as possible. Until an Allied invasion of the Balkans is well advanced, however, the invaders cannot count on the emergence of Hungarian patriot forces. At such a time, it might be possible to create such forces, but this will be a political rather than a military problem.

VII. POLAND

A. Strength and Degree of Organization and Training

1. Political Orientation. The Polish underground is one of the most thoroughly organized in Europe. It is also one of the most complex. Its several sub-groups have divergent aims which reflect age-old Polish problems:

a. intense class tensions between peasant, landlord, and bourgeois;

b. intense national difficulties with the USSR and Germany;

c. consciousness of a lack of historic and natural frontiers. With these matters in the background it is impossible to generalize on the political orientation of the underground movements. For example, the peasantry, notably in the eastern non-Polish parts of pre-war Poland, has sympathized with Russia, while the landholders and middle class have supported the Polish government in exile in London, or (to a much lesser extent) the Germans.

2. Existing Forces.

a. The Secret Army is reported to consist of some 65,000 men; a less reliable report puts the figure at 60 battalions -- 130,000 men. Most of the men have had military training, but as yet they do not constitute a cohesive and effective force capable of sustained and coordinated action. The Secret Army is directed by the Polish Government in London.

b. Partisan Bands of guerrillas are reported to consist mainly of Russians who have escaped from German prison camps. They are reported to be led by Russian officers dropped by parachute. These bands are in conflict with the "official" underground.

c. The Polish Workers Party is in close alliance with the above-mentioned bands. The government in exile accuses it of

i. being a front for the Polish Communist Party,

ii. being jointly responsible with the Partisan bands for acts of violence which lead to German reprisals at the expense of the "official" underground,

iii. even denouncing personnel of the loyalist faction to the Germans.

B. Equipment

1. Amount, Character, and Quality. The Secret Army is not equipped with heavy arms; it is reported to be fairly well equipped with small arms, ammunition, and explosives. More precise information lacking.

Partisan bands: no information.

2. Present Means of Maintaining Equipment. The Secret Army draws its equipment from the following three sources:

a. supplies concealed at the time of the occupation;

b. supplies sent from England;

c. supplies purchased or stolen from the Germans. Of these three sources the last is at present the most important.

Partisan bands: no precise information although it is presumed that Russia provides military supplies, and that equipment is also derived from raids upon the Germans.

C. Type of Service for Which Best Suited

1. Past Operations. For the most part, the Secret Army has devoted its attention to preparation for future action at the time of invasion. It is in close liaison with sabotage operatives, said to number several thousand trained officers.

The Partisan forces have engaged in extensive guerrilla and sabotage activities behind the German lines.

2. Political Factors. The Polish government in London exercises a direct control over the Secret Army. It can expect that the Army will undertake to carry out any orders it issues with respect to operations (guerrilla, sabotage, or other) to be conducted in Poland. However, the government can probably not predict how the Army would react to orders vis-à-vis Russia. It is very likely that the ideological and political issues which plague the government in exile are no more clearly resolved within the Polish Secret Army.

With respect to the Partisans it is possible to make more exact predictions. Should access to them be gained from the west, no activity contrary to Russian policy could be successfully initiated.

D. Rate of Increase in the Event of Imminent United Nations' Support

1. The Immediate Providing of Supplies. While no accurate estimate can be made with respect to the rate at which the Secret Army could be increased in size as a result of the immediate providing of additional supplies, there is considerable evidence to indicate that such an increase could be significant. (For details see E.3. below.)

Probable effect of additional supplies on size of Partisan bands: estimates difficult if not impossible to make.

2. Direct Military Operations. The degree of assistance the guerrillas of Poland might give to a United Nations' liberating invasion is dependent upon the nature of that invasion. The geographical location of Poland would preclude an Allied drive from the west or north until Germany had been neutralized; at some time prior to this Russia will

probably be able to assist Poland. Unless a binding agreement between the Polish and Russian governments has by then been reached, any unilateral action taken by the Russians would be supported only by the Partisans, whose ranks would probably be augmented by volunteers from the peasantry of eastern Poland and some working class elements. The bulk of the Secret Army, and all who might rally to it, would be in opposition to such Russian action.

E. Quantities and Types of Equipment Needed

1. Military Equipment. The Secret Army in Poland will doubtless continue to operate some distance from its principal friendly source of supply. This makes it imperative that small arms and sabotage matériel continue to be the basic types of equipment supplied to the Secret Army. The supplies already being furnished by the English could be supplemented by captured German small arms and ammunition, and with ammunition adapted for use in Polish weapons. Since the principal immediate military supplies for the Secret Army are acquired surreptitiously from the Germans by purchase, for which money, preferably dollar exchange, is necessary, negotiable funds could be provided by way of London.

Nothing is known about the needs of the Partisans with respect to military supplies.

2. Medical Supplies. While there is no specific information concerning the medical requirements of the Polish patriot forces, it is assumed that they are pressing. The severe demands placed upon Poland by the Germans, the wholesale malnutrition suffered by the people, together with widespread epidemic typhus, must have exacted their toll among the guerrilla forces.

3. The Delivery Problem. So far as the Polish Secret Army is concerned, the delivery problem is physical rather than political. The Sixth Bureau, with headquarters in England, serves as liaison between Warsaw and London, and, acting for the Polish government in exile, directs the activities of the Secret Army in Poland. The same bureau, in cooperation with the British, operates a training school and selects agents. The latter, supplied with British equipment, are dropped by parachute in Poland from British planes. As an indication of the problem involved, a serious crisis arose in November 1942 when planes intended for such use were diverted to North Africa. As a result, several hundred Poles who had been trained in sabotage and other underground activities could not be sent into the field. This situation, which had a bad effect on morale, has probably not materially improved, especially when considered in the light of the repercussions of the Polish-Russian break upon Anglo-Polish relations.

No outside groups other than the Russians are known to have established contact with the Partisan bands.

The obvious practical need in the case of Polish guerrilla activity is to provide some method by which a modus vivendi can be established between the Russians and Poles, to the end that assistance to one Polish faction will not be nullified by the counter action of the other.

VIII. BULGARIA

A. Existing Forces

There are no patriot forces at present active in Bulgaria. There are no guerrillas and no partisans. There is, however, a general state of unrest and discontent which at some future time might produce in the people and the army a significant degree of disaffection. The following may be of use in evaluating the possibilities of insurrection in Bulgaria and the Allied use of the insurgents.

1. The Nature of the Present Unrest. From time to time alleged Communists have been put to death for activities harmful to the State. Hardships of rationing, extreme anti-Semitic measures, fear of air raids, have all brought general popular discontent. Several extreme Bulgarian pro-Nazis have been assassinated. A change of government would meet with popular approval.

It is frequently alleged that a very large proportion of the Bulgarian population is Communist and therefore anti-Axis in sympathy. Their ability to overthrow or even seriously to discommode the present regime or the German occupying forces has, however, never manifested itself. No widespread disaffection has apparently arisen in the army.

2. Political and Military Considerations. Bulgaria was not invaded by Germany. Although many Bulgarians may have opposed the Axis alliance, the Government was sufficiently opportunist to accept territory from the Axis, and in exchange to join what looked like the winning side.

Unlike the Rumanians and Hungarians, the Bulgars have done no real fighting in this war. The Bulgarian army has been used only as occupying forces in Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia and Thrace. Even when Russian defeat seemed most probable, the Bulgarian government, because of the traditional Bulgarian affection for Russia, did not dare order the Bulgarian army into the fight against the Soviets. Moreover, there is every indication that the Bulgarian people regard as a mere formality the declarations of war upon them made by the United States and Britain. Bulgaria has an army of 800,000 men, 400,000 of whom are sufficiently well equipped to be regarded as first line troops.

B. Potential Forces

Three possible Allied decisions with regard to Bulgaria, and the effect of each upon potential Bulgarian resistance are discussed below.

1. Invasion from the West. An unpredictable number of Bulgarian troops might be transformed into patriot forces, while in any case the resistance of the Bulgarian army would be reduced to a minimum. If the invasion of the Balkans should come from the West (across the Adriatic), and the Germans and Italians should suffer a defeat in Yugoslavia and/or Albania before Bulgarian forces are seriously engaged, the Bulgarian army is likely to have little spirit for the fight when its turn comes. A prior Axis defeat in the Balkans would probably convince the Bulgarian army that the Allies are going to win, and that the only way to restore Bulgaria in the eyes of the Allies would be to turn against the Axis occupying forces. In this event, Allied forces would meet little resistance from the Bulgarian army, some at least of whose numbers would have become anti-Axis guerrillas.

2. Invasion from the South or East. If, on the other hand, the invasion of the Balkans should come from the South (across the Aegean and via Saloniki and Kavalla) or East (across the Turkish frontier), and enter Bulgaria first,

the Bulgarian army would be likely to resist effectively, especially if any Turkish troops should accompany the Allies.

3. No Invasion by the Western Allies. There remains to the Western Allies the possibility of ignoring Bulgaria altogether, and leaving to the Russians the task of neutralizing and occupying the country. The Bulgarians would probably prefer a Russian to an American-British occupation. It is doubtful whether the Germans could count on any substantial or reliable Bulgarian aid in resisting Russian armies.

SECRET

INFORMATION ON THE PATRIOT FORCES OF
FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, NORWAY, AND
DENMARK TO BE FURNISHED LATER.